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DOES DOMESTIC VIOLENCE DISAPPEAR 
FROM PARENTAL ALIENATION CASES? 
FIVE LESSONS FROM QUEBEC FOR 
JUDGES, SCHOLARS, AND 
POLICYMAKERS 
Suzanne Zaccour* 
The theory of parental alienation—which asserts that 
children who reject one parent are brainwashed by the other 
parent—has often been used to punish caring mothers and 
grant custody to dangerous fathers. The legal community’s 
quick infatuation with this concept has sparked fiery 
debates between its proponents and domestic violence 
scholars. My research contributes to this urgent 
conversation by shedding new light on the role of 
domestic violence in parental alienation cases. 
I observe how series of cases involving the same family 
deal with the issue of domestic violence. This method 
reveals a worrisome “disappearing act”: as families 
repeatedly interact with the justice system, domestic 
violence tends to leave the picture. The result? A 
distortion: most women accused of parental alienation are 
victims of conjugal violence, yet the jurisprudence barely 
addresses this issue. The disappearance of domestic 
violence creates the impression that it is the exception, 
rather than the norm, in parental alienation cases. 
 
*  Doctoral candidate in law at Oxford University; LLM (University of 
Cambridge), LLM (University of Toronto), BCL & LLB (McGill 
University); 2019–2020 judicial law clerk at the Supreme Court of 
Canada. suzannezaccour.com  
302 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 33, 2020] 
I draw five lessons from the Quebec jurisprudence:  
1) The prevalence of domestic violence in parental 
alienation cases is higher than we think;  
2) This is because domestic violence, alleged or proven at 
first instance, is often ignored on appeal; 
3) Domestic violence should instead be given centre stage 
in parental alienation cases; 
4) Considering parental alienation while ignoring 
domestic violence is a form of bias against women; 
5) Stating that the parental alienation framework applies 
unless there is domestic violence does not protect 
victims of undisclosed violence.  
The concept of parental alienation is dangerous for victims 
of family violence; thus, scholars suggest that when 
intimate partner violence is proven, the parental alienation 
framework should not apply. This caveat is not enough. 
My study challenges the conventional belief that 
domestic violence can be treated as a mere exception to 
parental alienation, calling for legal actors to reconsider 
the role of parental alienation in custody disputes.  
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INTRODUCTION 
When a child says, “I don’t want to see Daddy,” should we 
blame Mommy? Parental alienation answers “yes” but is 
often oblivious to the elephant in the room: family 
violence.  
In recent decades, the new theory of “parental 
alienation syndrome” or “parental alienation” has 
captivated courts, lawyers, and custody evaluators across 
the world. This craze has troubled feminists, as the theory 
attributes a child’s rejection of a parent (often the father) to 
manipulation and brainwashing by the other parent (often 
the mother). Today, many parental alienation scholars 
acknowledge domestic violence as a caveat to the parental 
alienation framework, a compromise that has not soothed 
the concerns of domestic violence scholars.  
Family law is not exactly the poster child for 
consensus. Yet, “[n]othing is more polarized in the family 
law field than the debate over domestic abuse and parental 
alienation.”1 At one end of the spectrum are feminists who 
state that the parental alienation belief system uses pseudo-
science to conceal men’s violence and further victimize 
women and children. At the other end, fathers’ rights 
militants paint alienation as child abuse inflicted by 
mothers to rob fathers of their children. In between these 
extremes lie researchers who propose to recognize parental 
alienation while also ensuring that violent fathers cannot 
use it to their advantage. They propose that when domestic 
 
1  Joan S Meier, “Getting Real About Abuse and Alienation: A Critique 
of Drozd and Olesen’s Decision Tree” (2010) 7:4 J Child Custody 219 
at 220 [Meier, “Getting Real About Abuse and Alienation”]. 
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violence or child abuse is proven, the parental alienation 
framework does not apply—a family-violence exception, 
if you will. 
But can parental alienation really be recognized 
without endangering victims of domestic violence? To 
answer this question, we must look at how alienation and 
violence interact in custody cases. While new research has 
started to uncover Canadian courts’ responses to parental 
alienation,2 the interaction between this concept and 
domestic violence remains elusive, in part because 
allegations of domestic violence are often left unresolved 
in parental alienation cases.3 
Enter this study. By examining all appellate cases 
mentioning parental alienation in Quebec between 2010 
and 2020 and, for each appeal, looking back to earlier 
decisions involving the same family, I pursue the inquiry 
into the interaction of domestic violence and parental 
alienation.  
 
2  See Suzanne Zaccour, “Parental Alienation in Quebec Custody 
Litigation” (2018) 59:4 C de D 1073; Linda C Neilson, Parental 
Alienation Empirical Analysis: Child Best Interests or Parental 
Rights? (Frederickton & Vancouver: Muriel McQueen Fergusson 
Centre for Family Violence Research & FREDA Centre for Research 
on Violence Against Women and Children, 2018) [Neilson, Parental 
Alienation Empirical Analysis]; John-Paul Boyd, Alienated Children 
in Family Law Disputes in British Columbia (Calgary: Canadian 
Research Institute for Law and the Family, 2015); Nicholas Bala, 
Suzanne Hunt & Carolyn McCarney, “Parental Alienation: Canadian 
Court Cases 1989–2008” (2010) 48:1 Fam Ct Rev 164. 
3  See Elizabeth Sheehy & Susan B Boyd, “Penalizing Women’s Fear: 
Intimate Partner Violence and Parental Alienation in Canadian Child 
Custody Cases” (2020) 42:1 J Soc Welfare & Fam L 80. 
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I show that domestic violence is more prevalent 
than it appears in parental alienation cases. It is the 
norm rather than the exception. We do not see it as such 
because, in cases where domestic violence was alleged at 
first instance, this context is often nowhere to be found in 
appellate decisions. In other words, domestic violence 
tends to disappear from parental alienation cases.  
This finding calls into question the proposition that 
courts should apply parental alienation concepts to custody 
cases in the absence of domestic violence. If domestic 
violence disappears, how are courts to protect mothers 
from false allegations of parental alienation by violent 
fathers? Domestic violence cannot be treated as a mere 
exception to the parental alienation framework. 
My study has important implications for parental 
alienation research and its use in legal cases. It confirms a 
gender bias in the way that a family’s history is carried 
through judicial decisions and sends a serious warning to 
judges, legislators, evaluators, and scholars who believe 
that we can think about parental alienation independently 
of domestic violence. 
CONTEXT: A PRIMER ON PARENTAL 
ALIENATION AND PARENTAL ALIENATION 
SYNDROME 
GARDNER’S PARENTAL ALIENATION 
SYNDROME 
Parental alienation syndrome is a disorder invented by 
psychiatrist Richard Gardner in the 1980s. He observed 
that children increasingly rejected their father during 
custody disputes, and he attributed this phenomenon to 
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brainwashing by mothers.4 He defined parental alienation 
syndrome as the programming of a child by the preferred 
parent (the “alienator” or “alienating parent”), coupled 
with the child’s own vilification of the rejected (or 
“alienated”) parent.5 He listed eight symptoms of parental 
alienation syndrome:  
1) the child denigrates the alienated parent; 
2) the child has no reasonable explanation for rejecting the 
alienated parent;  
3) “[t]he hated parent is viewed as ‘all bad’ and the loved 
parent is ‘all good;’”6  
4) the child insists that they are not influenced by the 
alienating parent; 
5) the child constantly sides with the alienating parent; 
6) the child feels no guilt for rejecting or being cruel 
towards the alienated parent; 
 
4  See Richard A Gardner, “Parental Alienation Syndrome vs. Parental 
Alienation: Which Diagnosis Should Evaluators Use in Child-Custody 
Disputes?” (2002) 30:2 Am J Fam Therapy 93 [Gardner, “Parental 
Alienation Syndrome”]. 
5  See ibid at 95. 
6  Richard A Gardner, “Recent Trends in Divorce and Custody 
Litigation” (1985) 29:2 Academy Forum 3, online: 
<www.fact.on.ca/Info/pas/gardnr85.htm>. 
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7) the child’s grievances towards the alienated parent 
mirror the alienator’s discourse and borrow adult 
vocabulary; 
8) the child rejects the alienated parent’s extended family, 
friends, and even pets.7 
In the blink of an eye, courts across the world 
embraced Gardner’s parental alienation syndrome. Used to 
explain a child’s refusal to see a parent (often the father), 
this theory has led courts to order sometimes drastic 
custody transfers and prevent any contact with the child’s 
preferred parent. Children have been sent to residential 
therapeutic programs to be deprogrammed,8 and courts 
have even intervened punitively to jail recalcitrant 
alienators and alienated children.9 
At the same time, Gardner’s theory also attracted 
considerable critique, specifically regarding its lack of 
scientific validity and blatant sexist bias.10 Some 
 
7  See ibid; Gardner, “Parental Alienation Syndrome”, supra note 4 at 97. 
See also Richard A Gardner, The Parental Alienation Syndrome: 
Second Edition: A Guide for Mental Health and Legal Professionals 
(Cresskill, NJ: Creative Therapeutics, 1998). 
8  See Richard A Gardner, Therapeutic Interventions for Children with 
Parental Alienation Syndrome (Cresskill, NJ: Creative Therapeutics, 
2001). 
9  Joan B Kelly & Janet R Johnston, “The Alienated Child: A 
Reformulation of Parental Alienation Syndrome” (2001) 39:3 Fam Ct 
Rev 249 at 250. 
10  See Richard Warshak, “Bringing Sense to Parental Alienation: A Look 
at the Disputes and the Evidence” (2003) 37:2 Fam LQ 273; Janet R 
Johnston & Joan B Kelly, “Commentary on Walker, Brantley, and 
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commentators have thus suggested that parental alienation 
syndrome is “junk science”11 that should not be admissible 
in court.12  
FROM PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME TO 
PARENTAL ALIENATION  
Researchers transformed and reformulated parental 
alienation syndrome to make it more scientific and less 
 
Rigsbee’s (2004) ‘A Critical Analysis of Parental Alienation 
Syndrome and Its Admissibility in the Family Court’” (2004) 1:4 J 
Child Custody 77 [Johnston & Kelly, “Commentary on Walker et al”]; 
Carol S Bruch, “Parental Alienation Syndrome and Parental 
Alienation: Getting It Wrong in Child Custody Cases” (2001) 35:3 
Fam LQ 527 [Bruch, “Getting It Wrong”]; Carol S Bruch, “Parental 
Alienation Syndrome: Junk Science in Child Custody Determinations” 
(2001) 3:3 Eur JL Ref 383; Richard Bond, “The Lingering Debate Over 
the Parental Alienation Syndrome Phenomenon” (2008) 4:1/2 J Child 
Custody 37; Lenore EA Walker, Kristi L Brantley & Justin A Rigsbee, 
“A Critical Analysis of Parental Alienation Syndrome and Its 
Admissibility in the Family Court” (2004) 1:2 J Child Custody 47; 
Lenore E Walker & David L Shapiro, “Parental Alienation Disorder: 
Why Label Children with a Mental Diagnosis?” (2010) 7:4 J Child 
Custody 266; Joan S Meier, “A Historical Perspective on Parental 
Alienation Syndrome and Parental Alienation” (2009) 6:3/4 J Child 
Custody 232 [Meier, “A Historical Perspective”]; Janet R Johnston & 
Joan B Kelly, “Rejoinder to Gardner’s ‘Commentary on Kelly and 
Johnston’s “The Alienated Child: A Reformulation of Parental 
Alienation Syndrome”’” (2004) 42:4 Fam Ct Rev 622; Michele A 
Adams, “Framing Contests in Child Custody Disputes: Parental 
Alienation Syndrome, Child Abuse, Gender, and Fathers’ Rights” 
(2006) 40:2 Fam LQ 315. 
11  See Bruch, “Parental Alienation Syndrome: Junk Science in Child 
Custody Determinations”, supra note 10. 
12  See James Williams, “Should Judges Close the Gate on PAS and PA?” 
(2001) 39:3 Fam Ct Rev 267. 
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gender-biased. Most famously, Joan Kelly and Janet 
Johnston proposed the new theory of “parental alienation,” 
abandoning its qualification as a “syndrome.”13 They 
defined the alienated child as one who “expresses, freely 
and persistently, unreasonable negative feelings and beliefs 
(such as anger, hatred, rejection, and/or fear) toward a 
parent that are significantly disproportionate to the child’s 
actual experience with that parent.”14  
Rejecting Gardner’s single focus on the evil 
alienator, Kelly and Johnston emphasized that “[t]here are 
multiple reasons that children resist visitation, and only in 
very specific circumstances does this behaviour qualify as 
alienation.”15 While indoctrinating behaviours are the 
norm in high-conflict custody-litigating families, only a 
small proportion of children actually become alienated.16 
Thus, “alienating behaviour by a parent is neither a 
sufficient nor a necessary condition for a child to become 
alienated.”17 Kelly and Johnston also acknowledged that 
evidence on long-term effects of parental alienation is 
weak18 and rejected the automatic custody transfers 
proposed by Gardner. For them, a custody transfer would 
only be warranted in the rare cases where the alienating 
 
13  See Kelly & Johnston, supra note 9. 
14  Ibid at 251. 
15  Ibid. 
16  Janet R Johnston, “Children of Divorce Who Reject a Parent and 
Refuse Visitation: Recent Research and Social Policy Implications for 
the Alienated Child” (2005) 38:4 Fam LQ 757 at 765. 
17  Kelly & Johnston, supra note 9 at 249. 
18  See Johnston & Kelly, “Commentary on Walker et al”, supra note 10 
at 86–87. 
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parent has serious parental deficits and the rejected parent 
provides a better alternative.19  
PARENTAL ALIENATION AND DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE  
Many domestic and family violence scholars are skeptical 
of the parental alienation belief system. They have 
described it as “simply one more attempt to blame mothers 
without considering fathers’ abuse of power and control.”20 
Why this mistrust? 
One major problem lies in plain sight in the origins 
of parental alienation syndrome. Not only is Gardner 
infamous for his misogynistic and pro-pedophilia takes,21 
he also emphasized false allegations of sexual violence as 
a common alienating tactic,22 making parental alienation 
syndrome a ready tool to disprove allegations of family or 
domestic violence.23 The idea that mothers program 
children to fear their fathers reinforces myths regarding 
 
19  See ibid at 87. 
20  Walker & Shapiro, supra note 10 at 275. 
21  See Jennifer Hoult, “The Evidentiary Admissibility of Parental 
Alienation Syndrome: Science, Law, and Policy” (2006) 26:1 Child 
Legal Rts J 1 at 18ff. 
22  Gardner, “Recent Trends in Divorce and Custody Litigation”, supra 
note 6; Gardner, The Parental Alienation Syndrome, supra note 7; 
Richard A Gardner, “Differentiating Between Parental Alienation 
Syndrome and Bona Fide Abuse-Neglect” (1999) 27:2 Am J Fam 
Therapy 97; Richard A Gardner, True and False Accusations of Child 
Sex Abuse (Cresskill, NJ: Creative Therapeutics, 1992); Gardner, 
“Parental Alienation Syndrome”, supra note 4. 
23  See Meier, “A Historical Perspective”, supra note 10. 
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family violence, marginalizes concerns for children’s 
safety, and puts women who denounce domestic violence 
at risk of losing custody.24  
The shift to parental alienation has not soothed all 
concerns: for some commentators, parental alienation and 
parental alienation syndrome remain “more similar than 
different.”25 Researchers have noted that in Quebec, 
professionals often use “parental alienation” and “parental 
alienation syndrome” interchangeably,26 and that 
professional publications “identif[y] domestic violence as 
a context that fosters the emergence of ‘alienating 
behaviours’ and increases the risk of ‘parental 
alienation.’”27 They also noted “evidence that post-
separation violence [is] generally ignored in the 
 
24  See e.g. Simon Lapierre & Isabelle Côté, “Abused Women and the 
Threat of Parental Alienation: Shelter Workers’ Perspectives” (2016) 
65 Child Youth Services Rev 120; Amy Neustein & Michael Lesher, 
From Madness to Mutiny: Why Mothers Are Running From the Family 
Courts—And What Can Be Done About It (Lebanon, NH: University 
Press of New England, 2005); Walker, Brantley & Rigsbee, supra note 
10. 
25  Meier, “A Historical Perspective”, supra note 10 at 246. The author 
qualifies parental alienation as “old wine in new bottles.” Newer 
models of parental alienation are also described as “improved science 
but more bad policy” (Bruch, “Getting It Wrong”, supra note 10 at 
541) or as successive heads of the parental alienation syndrome hydra 
that keep spouting up every time one is chopped (Amy Neustein & 
Michael Lesher, “Evaluating PAS: A Critique of Elizabeth Ellis’s ‘A 
Stepwise Approach to Evaluating Children for PAS’” (2009) 6:3/4 J 
Child Custody 322 at 322). 
26  Simon Lapierre et al, “The Legitimization and Institutionalization of 
‘Parental Alienation’ in the Province of Quebec” (2020) 42:1 J Soc 
Welfare & Fam L 30 at 42. 
27  Ibid at 40. 
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[professionals’] understanding of ‘parental alienation’ and 
in their promotion of father-child contact.”28 
Thus, despite the shift to a new paradigm, an “abuse 
victim who attempts to limit contact to an abuser may [still] 
be deemed hostile and unfriendly and punished for her 
protestations and vigilance.”29 As Linda Neilson explains 
in the Canadian context, there are systemic biases “against 
mothers/primary care givers and against domestic violence 
evidence in the cases that endorse parental alienation 
theory.”30 Protective mothers, she explains, are placed in a 
“horrifying double bind”: 
if the parent insists on presenting evidence of 
domestic violence or child abuse in order to 
protect the children she risks her efforts being 
categorized as attempts to alienate the 
children from the other parent. She may even 
face loss of primary care or even contact with 
her children. She thereby places her children 
at risk. If the protecting parent fails to present 
such evidence to the court, she also places the 
children at risk because the court making the 
custody and access order will have no 
knowledge of potential risks to children.31 
 
28  Ibid. 
29  Peter G Jaffe & Claire V Crooks, “Understanding Women’s 
Experiences Parenting in the Context of Domestic Violence: 
Implications for Community and Court-Related Service Providers” (St. 
Paul, MN: Violence Against Women Online Resources, 2005) at 4. 
30  Neilson, Parental Alienation Empirical Analysis, supra note 2 at 46. 
31  Ibid at 35. 
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Courts’ obsession with parental alienation also 
remains problematic due to the lack of scientific evidence 
on alienation’s long-term harm to children.32 By contrast, 
there is considerable evidence that children suffer from 
being exposed to domestic violence.33 Yet some courts 
view alienation as trumping violence and remove custody 
from the child’s preferred parent—the mother—even when 
they believe her claim that the father was violent towards 
her.34 
Parental alienation thus equips violent fathers with 
a blame-deflecting tool: often, “once alienation is alleged, 
abuse allegations become merely a reason to explore 
alienation, and the focus on safety concerns is lost.”35 
The problems raised by reciprocal allegations of 
domestic violence and parental alienation (“cross-claim” 
cases) are not marginal, although they remain understudied 
in Canada. In a study of 250 Quebec family cases involving 
domestic violence allegations, 15.6 percent mentioned 
 
32  See Johnston & Kelly, “Commentary on Walker et al”, supra note 10 
at 84. 
33  See Evan Stark, “Rethinking Custody Evaluation in Cases Involving 
Domestic Violence” (2009) 6:3/4 J Child Custody 287 at 289. 
34  See Joan S Meier, “US Child Custody Outcomes in Cases Involving 
Parental Alienation and Abuse Allegations: What Do the Data Show?” 
(2020) 42:1 J Soc Welfare & Fam L 92 at 99 [Meier, “US Child 
Custody Outcomes”]. 
35  Meier, “Getting Real About Abuse and Alienation”, supra note 1 at 
225. 
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parental alienation.36 In another Canadian study, Susan 
Boyd and Elizabeth Sheehy found that intimate partner 
violence was alleged in a third of alienation cases. Only in 
10 percent of those cases was intimate partner violence 
articulated as relevant to the child’s best interests. Most of 
the time, the allegation of intimate partner violence was 
instead mentioned but not resolved, or intimate partner 
violence was deemed irrelevant, characterized as a one-off 
occurrence, or mutualized as simple “conflict.”37 There are 
real concerns that the parental alienation belief system 
exacerbates the already problematic attitudes of the legal 
system towards domestic violence. In fact, feminist 
researchers and practitioners have documented countless 
horror stories where an accusation of parental alienation 
led to unfair, dangerous, and frankly shocking results.38 
Against this background, my study purports to 
further explain the relationship between parental alienation 
and domestic violence by interrogating the 
“disappearance” of domestic violence in alienation cases.  
 
36  See Dominique Bernier & Catherine Gagnon, Violence conjugale 
devant les tribunaux de la famille: enjeux et pistes de solution 
(Fédération des maisons d’hébergement pour femmes, 2019) at 25. 
37  See Sheehy & Boyd, supra note 3 at 83–87. 
38  See e.g. Meier, “Getting Real About Abuse and Alienation”, supra 
note 1 at 228–229. 
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THE STUDY: EXAMINING APPELLATE AND 
FIRST-INSTANCE CASES OF PARENTAL 
ALIENATION  
Studies on parental alienation cases in Canada often either 
explicitly exclude Quebec39 or use English search terms 
and common law databases,40 even though parental 
alienation seems to be particularly popular in Quebec.41 
My recent paper on all parental alienation decisions 
rendered in Quebec in 201642 is still, to my knowledge, the 
only study of the jurisprudence in that province. There I 
observed that: 
1) parental alienation is frequently used in Quebec 
custody decisions; 
2) mothers were are than twice as likely as fathers to be 
accused of alienation; 
3) judges appear unaware of the concurrent models and 
controversies regarding parental alienation; 
4) the jurisprudence is highly inconsistent and 
unscientific; and 
5) the behaviours considered to be alienating are not the 
same across genders.  
 
39  See e.g. Sheehy & Boyd, supra note 3. 
40  See e.g. Bala, Hunt & McCarney, supra note 2. 
41  See Lapierre et al, supra note 26; Lapierre & Côté, supra note 24. 
42  See Zaccour, “Parental Alienation in Quebec Custody Litigation”, 
supra note 2. 
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In the face of all these problems, there is still a lot 
to uncover, especially as the interaction of domestic 
violence with parental alienation claims in Quebec 
jurisprudence has not yet been closely examined.43 
This study is thus positioned directly at the 
intersection of parental alienation and domestic violence 
(assuming they are distinct streets to begin with). It stems 
from the observation that the prevalence and meaning of 
domestic violence in parental alienation cases are hard to 
ascertain.44 While parental alienation theorists may see 
domestic violence as an exception—a reason, perhaps, to 
exclude a finding of alienation—most domestic violence 
scholars see the two issues as closely interrelated. In fact, 
shelter workers in Quebec report that the threat of parental 
alienation accusations is one of their main concerns!45 
Existing literature demonstrates that allegations of 
intimate partner violence tend to receive insufficient 
scrutiny46 and trigger problematic assumptions about 
patriarchal violence, such as the myths that domestic 
violence causes little harm to the mother or child, that 
shared parenting is an appropriate goal in situations of 
family violence, and that domestic violence ceases with 
 
43  But see Lapierre & Côté, supra note 24. 
44  See for instance Zaccour, “Parental Alienation in Quebec Custody 
Litigation”, supra note 2 at 1103; Neilson, Parental Alienation 
Empirical Analysis, supra note 2 at 46. 
45  See Lapierre & Côté, supra note 24. 
46  See e.g. Linda C Neilson, “Spousal Abuse, Children and the Legal 
System”, Final Report for Canadian Bar Association, Law for the 
Futures Fund (March 2001). 
 DOES DOMESTIC VIOLENCE DISAPPEAR? 317 
separation.47 Others have noted that mediators, evaluators, 
and judges do not grant domestic violence the attention that 
it deserves and that they may even conceal it.48 Looking 
through series of cases involving the same family, I add to 
the argument that domestic violence is obscured in family 
law cases.  
I decided to test whether domestic violence risked 
disappearing in parental alienation cases—that is, not being 
carried forward in family law decisions. This could help 
explain why advocates who examine the legal system’s 
response to alienation from the perspective of accused 
mothers see domestic violence as the major issue, while 
some researchers, who read reported cases in isolation and 
especially appellate cases, see domestic violence as a 
secondary concern.  
To find out whether domestic violence disappears 
from alienation cases, I studied all decisions about parental 
alienation rendered by the Quebec Court of Appeal 
between 2010 and 2020.49 Then, using CanLII’s case-
history feature, as well as hints found in the decisions, I 
 
47  See Susan B Boyd & Ruben Lindy, “Violence Against Women and the 
BC Family Law Act: Early Jurisprudence” (2016) 35:2 Can Fam LQ 
101 at 136–137. 
48  See ibid; Mariachiara Feresin et al, “Family Mediation in Child 
Custody Cases and the Concealment of Domestic Violence” (2018) 
33:4 Affilia 509; Sheehy & Boyd, supra note 3. 
49  I searched on SOQUIJ with the following terms: alienation OU aliéné 
OU aliénant OU alienated OU alienating. Cases had to be from the 
Quebec Court of Appeal and be labelled as “family” or “child 
protection.” Dates: between January 1, 2010 and March 31, 2020. I 
excluded instances where parental alienation was mentioned but not in 
relation to that case.  
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tried to find all previous cases involving the same family. 
For example, an appellate decision could lead me to seven 
first instance decisions involving the same family, 
constituting one group of cases. I then separated the groups 
of cases based on whether there was a history or allegation 
of domestic violence in any of the linked cases.50  
 
50  I looked for mentions as well as cues of domestic violence, as it is not 
always mentioned explicitly. Occasionally, a judgment call had to be 
made, for example, coding one case as “no domestic violence” even 
though it included the father recording conversations between the 
mother and the child. 
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I arrived at the following distribution:   
 
In the Group A cases (green box, 39 percent of the 
total selection), there is a history of domestic violence, or 
at least alleged domestic violence, but the appellate 
decision makes no mention of it. This is what I call the 
disappearance of domestic violence.  
I note that within the Group A cases (green box), 
appellate decisions are more recent than within the Group 
B cases (purple box). In the first group, two thirds of the 
appellate cases were decided in 2018 or 2020; in the second 
320 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 33, 2020] 
group, ten out of the thirteen are dated 2014 or earlier. This 
may well be due to chance, but it could also be that more 
violent fathers are gaining access to appellate courts, which 
is concerning. It may also be that there are many victims of 
domestic violence in both groups, but that abusers have 
become somewhat easier to denounce in recent years.  
The rest of this article draws conclusions from the 
cases studied, focusing mostly on what the Group A 
cases—cases in which domestic violence disappeared at 
the appellate level—can teach scholars, practitioners, 
judges, custody evaluators, and other experts intervening 
in parental alienation cases. In my view, the disappearance 
of domestic violence in parental alienation is a serious 
cause for concern and reveals five major lessons:  
1) Domestic violence is more prevalent than we think in 
parental alienation cases; 
2) Domestic violence, alleged or proven at first instance, 
is often concealed on appeal; 
3) Domestic violence should be properly identified in 
parental alienation cases; 
4) Considering parental alienation while ignoring 
domestic violence is a form of gender bias; and 
5) We cannot rely on a “domestic violence exception” to 
the parental alienation belief system.  
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LESSON 1: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IS MORE 
PREVALENT THAN WE THINK IN PARENTAL 
ALIENATION CASES 
An important debate among scholars who study parental 
alienation is how prevalent domestic violence is in cases 
where parental alienation is alleged. To simplify a complex 
debate: for some, an accusation of alienation is a weapon 
of choice for violent fathers who want to blame the mother 
and direct the court’s attention away from their violence. 
For others, parental alienation is a useful concept in itself, 
and domestic violence is merely a special case—a reason 
not to apply, or perhaps to apply differently, the parental 
alienation framework.  
My study confirms that domestic violence is not a 
mere exception or rare occurrence in parental alienation 
cases. Rather, it is the norm. If we look only at appellate 
cases mentioning parental alienation, we get the impression 
that only 22 percent of these cases are also about domestic 
violence. Yet looking under the surface to consider all the 
decisions in the family’s litigation history reveals that at 
least 59 percent of cases involve a history or allegation of 
domestic violence. For reasons explained in the following 
section, even this high proportion is likely an 
underestimation. This means that appellate courts may see 
parental alienation as an issue unrelated to intimate partner 
violence, even as they are primarily dealing with families 
where there have been allegations of domestic violence.  
This finding helps contextualize case law analyses 
of parental alienation and intimate partner violence. 
Previous studies have measured domestic violence in 
parental alienation cases as follows: 
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• Susan Boyd and Elizabeth Sheehy’s study of Canadian 
cases (except Quebec): there were allegations of 
intimate partner violence in 34 percent of the parental 
alienation cases studied.51  
• My study of parental alienation cases in Quebec in 
2016: there is an allusion to intimate partner violence 
or violence against the child in a quarter of the cases.52  
• Bala, Hunt and McCarney’s study of parental 
alienation cases between 1989 and 2008: the court 
found that there was no parental alienation, but rather 
justified estrangement due to abuse or violence, in 5 out 
of 175 total cases.53  
• John-Paul Boyd’s study of British Columbia cases: in 
6 out of the 115 cases studied, “the court reached the 
decision that the child had become estranged from the 
rejected parent as a result of the parent’s actions.”54  
• Linda Neilson’s study of “357 Canadian trial and 
appeal cases in which parental alienation was claimed 
or found by a court”: 41.5 percent of parental alienation 
cases involved allegations of domestic violence and/or 
violence against the child.55 
 
51  See Sheehy & Boyd, supra note 3 at 83–87. 
52  See Zaccour, “Parental Alienation in Quebec Custody Litigation”, 
supra note 2 at 1083. 
53  See Bala, Hunt & McCarney, supra note 2 at 167. 
54  JP Boyd, supra note 2 at 14. 
55  Neilson, Parental Alienation Empirical Analysis, supra note 2 at 3. 
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• Bryanne Harris’s review of 100 Canadian cases:  
allegations of domestic violence against the 
alienating parent were present in 33% of the 
cases and these allegations were 
substantiated in a finding of domestic 
violence in 6% of these cases. Allegations of 
domestic violence against the alienated 
parent were present in 38% of the cases, and 
these allegations were substantiated in a 
finding of domestic violence in 9% of the 
cases.56 
As we can see, there is an interest in finding out 
how prevalent domestic violence is in parental alienation 
cases, but it is hard to reach a consensus due to difficulties 
with the data and variation in methods. I hope to add a piece 
to the puzzle that brings a word of caution: whatever 
statistic we can extract on domestic violence within 
parental alienation cases, it is bound to be inexact and 
underestimated. The intractability of domestic violence in 
alienation cases has (or should have) important 
implications for judges and scholars.  
LESSON 2: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ALLEGED 
OR PROVEN AT FIRST INSTANCE, IS OFTEN 
CONCEALED ON APPEAL 
Out of eighteen groups of cases with traces of domestic 
violence, twelve—a full two thirds!—lost that context at 
 
56  Bryanne M Harris, Assessing and Responding to Parental Alienation 
Cases: Does Gender Matter in Canadian Court Decisions? (Masters 
Thesis, University of Western Ontario, 2014) at 19. 
324 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 33, 2020] 
the appellate level. Even extreme violence can disappear: 
in Droit de la famille — 19803,57 the Court does not 
mention the allegation, at first instance, of “extreme 
conjugal violence against [the mother] which led to severe 
depression, anxiety and post traumatic syndrome 
disorder.”58 My finding that domestic violence tends to 
disappear from family cases challenges the popular belief, 
echoed in a 2007 decision by the Quebec Court of Appeal, 
that innocent fathers are unreasonably and categorically 
branded as “violent” in custody proceedings: 
It seems to me that there is sometimes a 
certain drift in the meaning of the term 
[“violence”]—a drift that is not just 
semantic and that can in a sense 
contaminate one’s outlook on a case. This 
type of labelling, in addition to framing a 
case, can also contribute to exacerbating the 
frustration of the person so labelled, 
poisoning the relationship between the 
parties, and worsening an already difficult 
situation. Once pronounced, the word 
“violence” rarely disappears from the file, 
even when the proof of its existence is not 
made.59 
What explains, then, the disappearance of domestic 
violence in the cases studied? We can envision two 
scenarios: either the judges never received the information, 
 
57  Droit de la famille — 19803, 2019 QCCA 800. 
58  Droit de la famille — 182879, 2018 QCCS 5992 at para 3.  
59  Droit de la famille — 072386, 2007 QCCA 1418 at para 72 [translated 
by author, emphasis added]. 
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or they chose not to include it in their decision. Both 
hypotheses suggest systemic problems about the legal 
system’s response to male violence against women. 
JUDGES ARE NOT TOLD ABOUT INTIMATE 
PARTNER VIOLENCE  
When domestic violence is not pleaded before an appellate 
court or mentioned in the decision under appeal, a judge 
can still find out about it by looking through previous 
linked decisions, as I did. However, chances are the context 
will be lost. The literature reveals a myriad of reasons why 
domestic violence may not be pleaded before a court or 
why facts may be “lost in translation.”  
One explanation is that men who are accused of 
domestic violence often retaliate with an accusation of 
parental alienation; therefore, women may hesitate to 
disclose domestic violence60 or to insist on it on appeal. 
Protective actions, such as limiting contact with a violent 
ex-partner, can be labelled alienating behaviour.61 
Moreover, merely saying that the father is violent, having 
 
60  See Lapierre & Côté, supra note 24 at 123; Feresin et al, supra note 
48. 
61  See Joyanna Silberg, Stephanie Dallam & Elizabeth Samson, “Crisis 
in Family Court: Lessons from Turned Around Cases”, Final Report to 
the Office of Violence Against Women, US Department of Justice (30 
September 2013); Meier, “US Child Custody Outcomes”, supra note 
34; Joan S Meier & Sean Dickson, “Mapping Gender: Shedding 
Empirical Light on Family Courts’ Treatment of Cases Involving 
Abuse and Alienation” (2017) 35:2 Law & Ineq 311; Sandra Spelman 
Berns, “Parents Behaving Badly: Parental Alienation Syndrome In The 
Family Court—Magic Bullet Or Poisoned Chalice” (2001) 15:3 Austl 
J Fam L 191. 
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a negative view of the father, or showing animosity can be 
considered proof of alienation.62 In one of the cases where 
domestic violence disappeared, the first-instance decision 
cited an expert report that explicitly associated protective 
behaviours with parental alienation: 
Ms. L . . . surely feels a lot of moral pain 
when she evokes especially her last years 
with Mr. M . . . The global picture then 
resembles what has been observed among 
victims of psychological abuse. Ms. L . . . 
presents herself with an aura of victim. This 
profile is to a certain extent compatible with 
her acts of affective protection towards her 
children. This propension to affective 
protection can give rise to a process of 
parental alienation.63  
The expert concluded that the children were alienated, even 
though there was no evidence that the mother openly 
denigrated the father.  
Some studies suggest that mothers who denounce 
the father’s violence receive worse custody outcomes.64 
Violent fathers are as likely as non-violent fathers to get 
 
62  See e.g. Zaccour, “Parental Alienation in Quebec Custody Litigation”, 
supra note 2. 
63  Droit de la famille — 172056, 2017 QCCS 3992 at para 49 [translated 
by author, emphasis added].  
64  See e.g. Silberg, Dallam & Samson, supra note 61. 
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custody,65 even when their violence has been confirmed by 
professionals.66 Women are also more than twice as likely 
to lose custody when they allege both sexual and physical 
violence against the child by the father compared to when 
they only allege sexual violence.67 One shocking study 
found that women who inform mediators that the father has 
been violent towards them are less likely to obtain sole 
custody than the violent father.68 
Against this backdrop, we can understand why 
domestic violence may not be pleaded consistently through 
repeated interactions with the courts, especially if previous 
attempts to draw attention to the father’s violence have 
proven useless or even backfired. While many believe the 
stereotype that mothers exaggerate or invent instances of 
 
65  See Dennis P Saccuzzo & Nancy E Johnson, “Child Custody 
Mediation and Domestic Violence” (2004) 251 Nat’l Inst Just J 21 at 
22, online (pdf): <www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/jr000251f.pdf> (reporting 
that “[f]athers who were accused of DV [domestic violence] were 
given primary custody in 10 percent of cases; non-DV fathers got 
primary custody 9 percent of the time”). See also Mary A Kernic et al, 
“Children in the Crossfire: Child Custody Determinations Among 
Couples with a History of Intimate Partner Violence” (2005) 11:8 
Violence Against Women 991 at 1006 (reporting that “[a]fter adjusting 
for relevant confounders, mothers in the IPV[intimate partner 
violence]-positive groups were no more likely than comparison group 
mothers to be awarded child custody”). 
66  See Christine Harrison, “Implacably Hostile or Appropriately 
Protective? Women Managing Child Contact in the Context of 
Domestic Violence” (2008) 14:4 Violence Against Women 381 at 395. 
67  See Meier, “US Child Custody Outcomes”, supra note 34 at 97 (“2.5 
times the odds”). 
68  See Saccuzzo & Johnson, supra note 65.  
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domestic violence to win a custody battle, the reality is that 
women consistently under-disclose.69 
Some of the cases studied illustrate the risks of 
disclosing violence, in that a judge or expert recounts the 
mother’s allegation with a negative or critical tone. For 
instance, in Droit de la famille — 162424, the mother 
appears stuck between the need to give the court a full 
portrayal of the father’s parental capacity and the pressure 
to appear friendly and cooperative:  
She denies with great detail having engaged 
in any form of parental alienation and she 
offers to continue the current status quo, that 
is, 50–50 shared custody. Despite this offer, 
the mother nonetheless refers to some 
episodes of violence by the father and of 
abusive language in the presence of their 
daughter.70 
Persisting in reporting domestic violence can be 
coded as stubbornness, especially when the mother lacks 
credibility—something that may happen precisely because 
of trauma symptoms.71 In some parental alienation cases, 
the more persistent the mother is in bringing evidence of 
 
69  Joan S Meier, “Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child 
Protection: Understanding Judicial Resistance and Imagining the 
Solutions” (2003) 11:2 Am U J Gender Soc Pol’y & L 657 at 684–685; 
Elizabeth M Schneider, Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking 
(Yale University Press, 2008) at 104–108. 
70  Droit de la famille — 162424, 2016 QCCS 4722 at para 12 [translated 
by author, emphasis added]. 
71  Jaffe & Crooks, supra note 29 at 9. 
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domestic violence to the court’s attention, the more she is 
penalized. The negative sentiment towards mothers who 
continue disclosing domestic violence is revealed by subtly 
pejorative phrasing, such as “[t]he Mother continues to see 
herself as a victim of violence”72 or, as said of the same 
mother in a later case, “the mother persists in describing 
herself as a victim of conjugal violence.”73 The expert’s 
observation that the mother “presents herself with an aura 
of victim,”74 in a case cited above, also connotes negative 
judgment. 
The problem of course is that not disclosing 
domestic violence also puts mothers and children at risk. In 
the framing contest of cross-claim cases, victims of 
domestic violence are damned if they do, damned if they 
don’t. 
Finally, it is worth also mentioning that appellate 
courts may fail to pick up on a context of domestic violence 
because of impoverished or distorted facts. Domestic 
violence is often euphemized, disguised, or presented as 
simple conflict.75 Therefore, courts may be unaware that 
domestic violence is being discussed. An example is a case 
that speaks of “inappropriate conduct towards the 
 
72  Droit de la famille — 10936, 2010 QCCS 1745 at para 138. 
73  Droit de la famille — 123572, 2012 QCCS 6542 at para 12 [translated 
by author].  
74  Droit de la famille — 172056, 2017 QCCS 3992 at para 49 [translated 
by author]. 
75  Michaël Lessard & Suzanne Zaccour, “Quel genre de droit? Autopsie 
du sexisme dans la langue juridique” (2017) 47:2/3 RDUS 227. 
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mother,”76 an expression that blurs violence and conflict. 
The euphemistic discourse on domestic violence may 
contribute to its disappearance on appeal.  
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE IS JUDGED 
IRRELEVANT  
Another possible scenario is that judges were made aware 
of the father’s violence but did not deem it relevant or 
important enough to warrant mention. Of course, there is 
nothing wrong about appellate courts not recounting every 
fact proven or alleged at first instance, particularly if the 
question at stake is merely procedural. However, all the 
cases considered did mention the context of parental 
alienation. Because of the relationship between domestic 
violence and claims of parental alienation, the loss of an 
important part of the context is unfortunate.  
How can domestic violence be considered not 
worth mentioning? In family law, there is a prevalent belief 
that domestic violence is unimportant, based on the twin 
myths that domestic violence stops after separation or does 
not affect the child.77 These myths put women and children 
at risk, especially given the Divorce Act’s command that 
“the court shall not take into consideration the past conduct 
 
76  Droit de la famille — 182288, 2018 QCCS 4677 at para 27 [translated 
by author]. 
77  See Elizabeth A Sheehy, Defending Battered Women on Trial: Lessons 
From The Transcripts (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013) at 221; Peter G 
Jaffe, Nancy KD Lemon & Samantha E Poisson, Child Custody and 
Domestic Violence: A Call for Safety and Accountability (Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003) at 9; Fiona Kelly, “Producing Paternity: The 
Role of Legal Fatherhood in Maintaining the Traditional Family” 
(2009) 21:2 Can J Women & L 315 (at e.g. 334). 
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of any person unless the conduct is relevant to the ability 
of that person to act as a parent of a child.”78 The Supreme 
Court has also affirmed that reprehensible parental conduct 
is irrelevant “unless it relates to the ability of the parent to 
meet the needs of the child.”79 The custodial parent’s safety 
concerns are entirely marginalized. In Droit de la famille 
— 19698,80 the Court of Appeal goes a step further, stating 
that parental alienation is relevant to the analysis:  
Yet the Supreme Court specified in Goertz 
that “[p]arental conduct, however 
meritorious or however reprehensible, does 
not enter the analysis unless it relates to the 
ability of the parent to meet the needs of the 
child.” This will be the case, for example, 
when the parent behaves in a way akin to 
parental alienation or tries to prevent 
 
78  Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp), s 16(9). New amendments to 
the Divorce Act are due to come into force in 2021. Section 16(5) will 
then state that “[i]n determining what is in the best interests of the child, 
the court shall not take into consideration the past conduct of any 
person unless the conduct is relevant to the exercise of their parenting 
time, decision-making responsibility or contact with the child under a 
contact order.” An Act to amend the Divorce Act, the Family Orders 
and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act and the Garnishment, 
Attachment and Pension Diversion Act and to make consequential 
amendments to another Act, SC 2019, c 16, s 12. 
79  Gordon v Goertz, [1996] 2 SCR 27 at para 21, 134 DLR (4th) 321. 
80  Note that this case was not counted in the statistics for this study 
because parental alienation was not mentioned in relation to its facts. 
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contacts between the other parent and the 
child.81  
In cross-claim cases, the parent who alleges 
alienation is privileged over the parent who alleges 
domestic violence, and this may explain the concealment 
of the latter.  
We can see domestic violence being filtered out in 
a case allowing the father’s appeal of a decision granting 
the mother unsupervised access. The appeal judgment 
recounted how the Director of Youth Protection has been 
involved with the family since the child was eight months 
old. Summarizing the decision to declare the child’s 
situation compromised, the Court of Appeal wrote: “Justice 
Perreault underscores that the Director of Youth Protection 
alleges that the mother has unresolved antecedents of 
negligence and that the father has a drug addiction 
problem.”82 That decision by Justice Perreault, however, 
had also noted the father’s domestic violence: 
At the time of the report, the father had 
completed a therapy for his drug addiction. 
He is described as impulsive and violent. 
He has antecedents of drug trafficking and 
possession of narcotics. After a four-year 
relationship, the father had found a new 
apartment, but, in fact, he still lived with the 
mother. The mother justified the father’s 
 
81  Droit de la famille — 19698, 2019 QCCA 731 at para 15 [translated by 
author, emphasis added]. 
82  Droit de la famille — 162895, 2016 QCCA 1914 at para 4 [translated 
by author]. 
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behaviour, not realizing the violence of 
which she was victim.83 
In summarizing relevant facts pertaining to the 
father’s situation, the Court of Appeal thus focused on drug 
consumption instead of domestic violence. We don’t know 
that this questionable summary impacted the custody 
outcome, but the choice of relevant facts is puzzling, to say 
the least. It suggests that domestic violence might not be 
what makes an impression on judges deciding on a child’s 
care.  
I hasten to point out that, of course, the factors I 
have discussed can also apply at first instance. This means 
that even the cases where there are no signs of domestic 
violence at any level (the Group B cases) can be cases 
where domestic violence has “disappeared” because it was 
not pleaded or was found irrelevant.  
Indeed, other studies have observed the 
euphemizing, distorting, and erasing of domestic violence 
at trial as well as in the mediation process.84 In fact, in one 
of the cases studied, the Court of Appeal criticized the first-
instance judge for paying insufficient attention to the 
testimony regarding the father’s violence towards one of 
 
83  Protection de la jeunesse – 121767, 2012 QCCQ 10587 at para 5 
[translated by author, emphasis added]. 
84  See Suzanne Zaccour, “Crazy Women and Hysterical Mothers: The 
Gendered Use of Mental-Health Labels in Custody Disputes” (2018) 
31:1 Can J Fam L 57 [Zaccour, “Crazy Women and Hysterical 
Mothers”]; Lessard & Zaccour, supra note 75; Feresin et al, supra note 
48; Neilson, supra note 46 at 127; Neilson, Parental Alienation 
Empirical Analysis, supra note 2; Sheehy & Boyd, supra note 3. 
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his ex-partners.85 Domestic violence is minimized and 
ignored at all court levels and at all stages of the legal 
battle.  
LESSON 3: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SHOULD BE 
PROPERLY IDENTIFIED IN PARENTAL 
ALIENATION CASES 
We have seen that courts fail to identify domestic violence 
in alienation cases. Why does it matter? In this section, we 
see the difference that intimate partner violence can or 
should make when properly identified and considered. 
The first thing to note is that the mere fact that 
violence against the mother (or child) is mentioned does 
not mean it will be taken seriously. Judges and experts can 
still minimize, excuse, and neutralize family violence, like 
in one case where the father’s violence is discounted 
because the child can recall “only three events.”86 
Nonetheless, domestic violence often has the 
potential to change the nature of the case under study. This 
will be illustrated with a few sets of cases.  
First, consider the case Droit de la famille — 
181055. Here the father appealed from a judgment granting 
custody to the mother; he asked for a stay of the provisional 
execution of the judgment.87 The Court of Appeal granted 
the stay, something which is possible only in narrow 
 
85  Droit de la famille — 161960, 2016 QCCA 1300 at para 98. 
86  Droit de la famille — 20117, 2020 QCCA 150 at para 40 [translated by 
author].  
87  See Droit de la famille — 181055, 2018 QCCA 806 at paras 1–2. 
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circumstances.88 Reading the facts, we see a case about 
false abuse allegations, a common trope in parental 
alienation discourse: 
there has been intense and acrimonious 
litigation between the parties since their 
separation in 2010 respecting custody and 
access to their two children . . . There is no 
doubt that the relationship between the 
parties has been both toxic and troubling. 
There have been numerous judgments in this 
file and many experts have been involved in 
preparing lengthy reports. There have also 
been numerous interventions by Youth 
Protection and the police—largely at the 
request of the respondent mother—all of 
which have concluded that the complaints 
made against the appellant father were 
unfounded.89 
The court also cited part of a previous decision 
which blamed the mother for cutting the father out of her 
and her children’s lives. After going through these facts, 
the court discounted current allegations of child abuse: 
“this is not the first time that Y has alleged physical abuse 
by his father. All past similar claims have been dismissed 
by Youth Protection as unfounded and presumably 
resulting from prompting by the respondent mother.”90 The 
twelve-year-old child’s wishes were similarly given little 
 
88  See ibid at paras 4–5. 
89  Ibid at para 9 [emphasis added]. 
90  Ibid at para 15. 
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importance: “This is not the first time Y has indicated that 
he wishes to live with his mother, though the record shows 
that he has changed his mind about this time and time 
again.”91 The court concluded that “a serious and 
irreparable prejudice will result from Y being removed 
from his father and that the balance of inconvenience 
favours granting the stay and thus maintaining the status 
quo [of joint custody].”92 
What we read is a case about the worst kind of 
alienation: a mother making up child-violence allegations 
to prevent a child from having a relationship with their 
father.  
But the case is coloured by the choice of facts to be 
recounted and repeated. The exclusion of domestic 
violence from these facts makes the mother’s behaviour 
appear irrational. 
Looking through first-instance decisions associated 
with the same family, we see another potential narrative 
emerging. One first-instance decision not only described 
allegations of violence, but also characterized the mother’s 
description as truthful:  
The Mother has a lot of complaints about the 
Father being manipulative. I have already 
said it, it is true that he has involved the 
children in the proceedings. He can be violent 
and yell. He is an emotive, angry man who is 
capable of making threats. All of this I 
 
91  Ibid at para 18. 
92  Ibid at para 20.  
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believe. He has insulted the Mother and 
has done so in the presence of the children. 
He has shown contempt towards her 
several times. His attitude towards her is 
often contemptuous. I have seen it even in 
court. These are, as I have said, serious 
problems. But I am of the view that, in the 
circumstances of this case, this does not 
affect the father’s capacity to have custody.93 
Ironically—but as often happens in cases involving 
domestic violence—the father’s behaviour is actually 
alienating behaviour: insulting the mother in the presence 
of the children, showing disdain towards her, implicating 
the children in the dispute.94 Yet, even as the father is 
shown to be both violent and potentially alienating, he is 
found to be a capable father.  
Another first-instance decision implicating the 
same family, rendered one year later, found the father in 
contempt “for having repeatedly sent emails to the 
[mother]” in breach of a court order.95 The father was 
ordered to pay a punitive $1100.96  
The case that seemed to be about an acrimonious 
mother who makes baseless complaints of child violence 
becomes, with another choice of facts, the story of a father 
 
93  Droit de la famille — 114423, 2011 QCCS 7548 at para 48 [translated 
by author, emphasis added]. 
94  See Meier, “A Historical Perspective”, supra note 10 at 234 for the 
proposition that violent partners employ “alienating” behaviours. 
95  Droit de la famille — 17473, 2017 QCCS 947 at para 1. 
96  See ibid at para 14. 
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who harasses the mother, alienates the child, and 
disrespects court orders.  
A second and similar example of a case’s 
transformation is Droit de la famille — 20370.97 Again, 
there is no mention of domestic violence in the appeal 
decision: the case is about false accusations of violence 
against the child. Yet, looking through the first-instance 
decision, we find at least one instance of domestic violence 
in the presence of the child. In this case, despite allegations 
that the father had been violent and despite alienation by 
the mother remaining unproven, custody was entrusted to 
the father. The Court wrote: “Even though there isn’t any 
proof of parental alienation by the Mother, the Court finds 
a certain scent of alienation by the Mother.”98 
Why do these cases matter? False and malicious 
allegations of child violence are the emblem of parental 
alienation. Yet, allegations of child violence that seem 
inexplicable suddenly make a lot more sense (or a different 
sense) once domestic violence is recounted, especially as 
we know that intimate partner violence and child violence 
often co-occur.99 The cases described above testify to the 
importance of contextualizing behaviour that appears 
alienating and testing the concurrent explanation of 
 
97  Droit de la famille — 20370, 2020 QCCA 418. 
98  Droit de la famille — 191105, 2019 QCCS 2367 at para 73 [translated 
by author].  
99  See e.g. Carolyn Copps Hartley, “The Co-occurrence of Child 
Maltreatment and Domestic Violence: Examining Both Neglect and 
Child Physical Abuse” (2002) 7:4 Child Maltreatment 349. 
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domestic and family violence. Domestic violence changes 
the narrative, if not always the outcome.  
Similarly, the multiplication of procedures that 
signal “high conflict” in the parental alienation paradigm 
can be interpreted differently in the context of intimate 
partner violence. Excessive litigation may itself be 
domestic violence in the form of court-related harassment 
and economic violence by the parent with more means. It 
can also be explained by the protective mother being 
desperate to shield the child from the violent father, even if 
the costs are high and her chances are low. Courts must 
correctly identify and interpret these scenarios, or else they 
will continue being a tool for post-separation control. 
Courts should also be wary of chastising both 
parties or encouraging mediation in response to excessive 
litigation. In Droit de la famille — 111373, a case where 
there is no mention of domestic violence in the appeal 
decision, the Court writes: 
Each parent going back to a more 
conciliatory approach would no doubt be 
beneficial for all the people involved. In 
matrimonial matters, more than in any other, 
court decisions are not the only way to 
resolve difficulties. Reasonable agreements 
between the parties, under the sign of mutual 
understanding and respect, have virtues that 
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the best judicial orders could never 
replace.100 
Suggesting conciliation to a mother who, according 
to a previous decision, sees herself as a victim of domestic 
violence,101 disregards the woman’s perspective and 
assumes her capacity to negotiate on an equal footing with 
her ex-partner.  
A DIVIDED CASE: PARENTAL ALIENATION 
VERSUS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE  
For a powerful example of why domestic violence must be 
identified and named, I now turn to the only divided 
appellate decision within my sample.  
Droit de la famille — 112019102 is an appeal from 
a decision giving the father custody of two young children 
(a two-year-old and a four-year-old) following the 
mother’s relocation. The majority judges dismissed the 
appeal; the dissenting judge would have allowed it and 
returned the custody of the children to the mother. 
The majority judges start their decision with a 
minimalistic recounting of the facts that does not include 
domestic violence:103  
• the parties are in their early twenties; 
 
100  Droit de la famille — 111373, 2011 QCCA 889 at para 35 [translated 
by author]. 
101  See Droit de la famille — 123572, 2012 QCCS 6542 at para 12. 
102  Droit de la famille — 112019, 2011 QCCA 1308. 
103  See ibid at paras 9–16. 
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• they lived together less than three years; 
• the father did not see much of the children in the first 
year after the separation (the appellate judges do not 
say why—the reader might assume it is the mother’s 
fault, considering the role that parental alienation takes 
in the decision); 
• the parties agreed that the mother would have custody; 
• the mother met a man on the internet; 
• the mother and children moved in with the new 
boyfriend in a new city; and 
• the parties agreed that the children would be with the 
father for one week every two months. 
Moving on to the trial judge’s decision to grant 
custody to the father,104 the appellate judges note, with 
approval, what the trial judge observed based on the 
evidence before him: 
• the mother-child bond seems “very strong” but “not 
necessarily positive” or “healthy” if the mother tries to 
exclude the father;105 
• the children love both parents;106   
• the trial judge fears alienation by the mother, and the 
father is more open to the mother’s involvement;107 
• there are not only negative, but also positive, elements 
in the psychological evaluation of the father;108 
 
104  See ibid at para 17.  
105  See ibid at paras 28, 29. 
106  See ibid at para 31. 
107  See ibid at paras 31, 34. 
108  See ibid at para 35. 
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• while the father is far from perfect, he has changed109 
(but we do not know from what he has changed, as the 
appellate judges still have not mentioned domestic 
violence); 
• the mother became infatuated with a stranger by 
chatting online, did not consider the children’s interest, 
moved in with him, and robbed the children of their 
father;110 and 
• the children will develop better relationships with their 
extended family if the father has custody. 
After going through the trial judge’s reasoning, the 
majority judges conclude that there was no error 
warranting intervention. 
This analysis, and especially the recounting of the 
facts, obscures the real nature of the case: custody is 
granted to the mother’s violent ex-partner, despite an 
agreement between the parents that the mother would have 
custody, to punish her for moving in with a new boyfriend. 
The difference that a more complete recounting of the facts 
can make is evidenced by the dissenting judge’s decision. 
Indeed, the dissenting judge sees things very 
differently. For him, it is unthinkable to deprive toddlers of 
their caring mother without serious cause: the trial judge’s 
decision goes against the children’s best interest.111  
 
109  See ibid at para 40. 
110  See ibid at para 47. 
111  See ibid at para 60. 
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The dissenting judge goes deeper into the facts and tells a 
different story: 
• the parties lived together and had a first child;112 
• while the mother was pregnant with their second child, 
the father assaulted her; she had to flee and find refuge 
with the father’s parents;113 
• the mother gave birth to her second child while the 
parties were still separated;114 
• a criminal complaint was lodged against the father;115 
and  
• the father recognized these facts and agreed not to 
contact the mother or the children.116 
In the dissenting judgment, these facts are very 
important. The mother recounted, and the father admitted, 
that it was not the first time that he was violent towards her. 
Domestic violence is relevant not only to explain why the 
father did not see the children following the separation, but 
also as an important factor in itself.117 For the dissenting 
judge, domestic violence, an issue ignored by the majority, 
is relevant to the father’s parental capacity.  
Moving on to the mother’s decision to move to a 
new city, the dissenting judge once again tells the facts 
 
112  See ibid at para 61. 
113  See ibid at para 62. 
114  See ibid. 
115  See ibid at para 63. 
116  See ibid. 
117  See ibid at para 73.  
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quite differently than the majority and trial judges. The 
paragraph is worth citing in full as it shows the mother’s 
behaviour as understandable and reasoned: 
After the separation, the appellant was 25 
years old and was raising her two children 
alone. She evidently wished to start over and 
meet a man. She was lucky as she fell in love 
with a man who lived in city D. 
Unfortunately, he could not leave [the region 
of city D] to come live in city G. For her own 
happiness and for her children’s, the 
appellant decided to go live in city D with her 
lover. Before leaving city G, she tried to 
communicate with the respondent via the 
Internet to reach an agreement regarding 
access rights. . . . [B]ut there was no 
agreement and so the respondent introduced 
a motion to institute proceedings to obtain 
custody of the children.118 
Moreover, referencing the psychological report on 
the father, the dissenting judge cites the expert’s 
observation that the father could become violent towards 
the children if he had to care for them for a long period.119  
These facts set the stage for a very different 
analysis of the children’s interests and the trial judge’s 
errors. The risk of paternal violence alone, in my view, 
should put an end to any question of granting custody to 
the father, yet the majority judges do not even mention it. 
 
118  Ibid at para 69 [translated by author].  
119  See ibid at para 74. 
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As the dissenting judge finds, a father who (1) is prone to 
violence and (2) never cared for the children, either 
emotionally or financially, should not be granted 
custody.120 The trial judge erred because he could not 
accept that the twenty-five-year-old mother was entitled to 
move forward with her life, with a man she met on the 
internet.121 He found the mother not credible, even though 
it was the father who lied,122 and he relied on other illogical 
findings.123 The dissenting judge further observes that 
separating the children from the mother to favour 
occasional contact with grandparents is unjustified.124 
Interestingly, the dissenting judge looks at the 
children’s interest by placing himself in their shoes: 
Since the two children cannot express 
themselves, the [trial] judge should have put 
himself in their place and considered that the 
appellant is a loving and devoted mother, that 
the children have always been with her since 
their birth […]. Putting myself in the place of 
the two children, I would not have much 
desire to go live with a man who assaulted my 
mother, who harassed her and threatened her, 
 
120  See ibid at paras 74, 78. 
121  Ibid at para 81. 
122  Ibid at para 88. 
123  Ibid at para 107.  
124  Ibid at para 93.  
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and who even invited my mother’s partner to 
engage in a fist fight with him.125 
Echoing my comments above that domestic 
violence explains seemingly alienating behaviour, the 
dissenting judge finds that intimate partner violence 
explains and justifies the mother not wanting to see the 
father: 
The judge blames the appellant for baptising 
Y without asking for the respondent’s 
opinion. Considering that both parties are 
catholic, the failure to consult the father is not 
very relevant. Moreover, considering that 
when the mother was pregnant she was 
assaulted by the respondent, one can 
understand that she did not wish to see 
him. Perhaps she could have advised him of 
the date and the time of the religious 
ceremony, but she certainly did not have the 
obligation to invite him to the party that 
followed the religious ceremony. It is not 
unhelpful to say that the appellant did invite 
the respondent’s parents to the party—
parents with whom she is on good terms—
even though that is not the case for the 
respondent.126 
Because violent men often denigrate their ex-
partner, domestic violence is also relevant to the issue of 
denigration, which is often taken as a sign of parental 
 
125  Ibid at para 91 [translated by author]. 
126  Ibid at para 96 [translated by author, emphasis added]. 
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alienation: “Actually, given the behaviour of the 
respondent up to now and his character, I am much more 
concerned that the respondent will speak badly of the 
appellant than that the appellant will destroy the 
respondent’s image in the children’s mind.”127 
Even though the father is likely to be violent and 
alienating towards the children, it is the mother who loses 
custody. As is often the case within the twisted logic of 
parental alienation, the goal is supposedly to protect the 
children’s relationship with both parents, but in fact courts 
sacrifice the children’s bond with their primary caretaker 
to protect their non-existent relationship with an unfit 
father.128  
There is nothing surprising about courts telling the 
facts in a way that supports their conclusion. Yet the 
majority judges’ refusal to even acknowledge domestic 
violence puts the case firmly within the parental alienation 
paradigm. The majority judges can then present a selfish 
mother who moved for no good reason and are relieved 
from having to justify their controversial use of parental 
alienation in a context of violence. By contrast, the 
dissenting judge’s recounting of the facts shows a 
protective mother who tried to move on from a violent 
relationship and was punished for it—a mother who had 
 
127  Ibid at para 106 [translated by author]. 
128  See Meier, “A Historical Perspective”, supra note 10 at 243. On the 
importance afforded to protecting (and even developing) fathers’ 
relationships with children (even over safety concerns), see Fiona 
Kelly, “Enforcing a Parent/Child Relationship at All Cost? Supervised 
Access Orders in the Canadian Courts” (2011) 49:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 
277. 
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three excellent reasons to justify her sole custody: domestic 
violence, the parties’ previous agreement, and proven 
capacity to take care of the children as the primary and even 
sole caretaker.  
In family cases, we rarely get the benefit of seeing 
a case from two diametrically opposed angles. Dissents are 
rare, and so are successful appeals. This case thus provides 
a precious window into what family cases could look like 
if domestic violence were mentioned and given the centre 
stage it deserves. 
LESSON 4: CONSIDERING PARENTAL 
ALIENATION WHILE IGNORING DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE IS A FORM OF GENDER BIAS 
Gender bias is an important theme in the parental alienation 
literature, and scholars debate the extent to which the 
parental alienation belief system penalizes mothers. 
Studies consistently show that mothers are more likely than 
fathers to be accused of alienation, yet some explain away 
the gender imbalance by stating that “differences in gender 
are [simply] reflective of custody and child care 
arrangements.”129 In other words, because parental 
alienation is more often perpetrated by the custodial parent, 
and because mothers are often the custodial parent, any 
gender bias is merely apparent.  
While it is true that custodial parents are more 
likely to be accused of alienation (as it is a strategy to get a 
change in custody), parental alienation is still articulated in 
ways that show gender bias. In my study of Quebec 
 
129  Bala, Hunt & McCarney, supra note 2 at 167. 
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parental alienation cases, for instance, I found that only 
women were found alienating based on passive or 
unconscious behaviours, such as feeling emotions or 
resentment, being overprotective, and asking the court not 
to order contact with the father.130 Alienating fathers had 
engaged in tangible and concrete alienating behaviour 
outside of court.  
Another facet of gender bias that appears clearly 
with this study is the privileging of the alienation story over 
the domestic violence story.131 Since mothers are more 
likely to be accused of parental alienation and fathers more 
likely to be accused of domestic violence, privileging 
parental alienation is gender bias. The preference for 
parental alienation cannot be justified by a desire to protect 
children—even leading alienation theorists recognize that 
the long-term effects of alienation on children are purely 
speculative,132 contrary to the effects of exposure to 
domestic violence. In other words, gender bias is also bias 
towards the male narrative.  
The bias towards the parental alienation story is 
especially problematic in cross-claim cases, but it is most 
evident in some cases where the mother accuses the father 
of both alienation and domestic violence.  
 
130  See Zaccour, “Parental Alienation in Quebec Custody Litigation”, 
supra note 2 at 1103. 
131  This is also discussed in Meier, “Getting Real About Abuse and 
Alienation”, supra note 1. 
132  See Johnston & Kelly, “Commentary on Walker et al”, supra note 10 
at 84. 
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An example can be found in Droit de la famille — 
103138. The first-instance decision recounted that “the 
mother had to call the police many times. The father was 
following her despite a restraining order. There are three 
criminal charges pending against the father following 
complaints by the mother.”133 Despite this context of 
intimate partner violence, it is the risk of parental alienation 
that survived on appeal. The domestic violence issue went 
unmentioned in the summary of the trial judge’s decision: 
Even though [the judge] considers that [the 
father] has a good relationship with X, she is 
of the view that if the child remains in 
Quebec, the evidence shows that there is a 
risk of parental alienation. The [father’s] 
actions during the last few months indicate 
that this possibility exists and justify the 
judge’s conclusions considering the available 
evidence.134 
In another case, the mother alleged at trial “extreme 
conjugal violence against her which led to severe 
depression, anxiety and post traumatic syndrome disorder 
(PTSD).”135 The trial judge minimized the issue: “The fact 
that the mother suffered PTSD and serious depression as a 
consequence of the toxic relationship she had with 
 
133  Droit de la famille — 103756, 2010 QCCS 6843, SOQUIJ AZ-
50721040 at para 27. 
134  Droit de la famille — 103138, 2010 QCCA 2143 at para 16 [translated 
by author, emphais added]. 
135  Droit de la famille — 182879, 2018 QCCS 5992 at para 3.  
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Monsieur is not a reason in itself to grant her custody.”136 
The judge found that whether there was parental alienation 
by the father was “not an easy question to answer,”137 but 
that there was “definitively” a conflict of loyalty.138 On 
appeal, domestic violence was not mentioned—neither by 
the court nor, it seems, by the appellant mother.139 The 
grounds of appeal exclusively relate to alienation. 
Privileging the parental alienation story over the 
domestic violence story can lead to dramatic consequences, 
as the two frameworks focus on very different risks and 
values. The horror stories abound in the literature: to 
prevent the loss of a parent, courts endanger the child and 
separate them from their other parent. In one of the cases 
studied, the mother was sentenced to six months of 
incarceration for not bringing the adolescent children to a 
summer camp, when the children themselves were refusing 
to go! The Court of Appeal quickly suspended the 
execution of the judgment by finding that there were 
procedural irregularities and that the sentence was 
excessive.140 Nonetheless, a decision rendered the 
following year reveals that the mother, who had not had 
any contact with her son for more than two years, still could 
not resume contact.141 The potential negative consequences 
of a finding of parental alienation cannot be exaggerated.  
 
136  Ibid at para 32. 
137  Ibid at para 35. 
138  Ibid at para 36. 
139  See Droit de la famille — 19803, 2019 QCCA 800. 
140  Droit de la famille — 12551, 2012 QCCA 501. 
141  Droit de la famille — 133731, 2013 QCCS 6621. 
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Gender bias already existed in family courts before 
the rise of parental alienation theory. This means that 
mothers must not only cope with the threat of parental 
alienation accusations, but also with a broader context in 
which women are easily disbelieved and pathologized.142 
Contrary to the popular belief that mothers get easy wins 
in family courts, the cards are actually stacked against them 
from the very start.143  
LESSON 5: WE CANNOT RELY ON A 
“DOMESTIC VIOLENCE EXCEPTION” TO THE 
PARENTAL ALIENATION BELIEF SYSTEM 
My study supports the argument that domestic violence 
cannot be treated as a mere exception in parental alienation 
cases. First, domestic violence is more like the norm than 
the exception, given the high proportion of cases in which 
traces of domestic violence allegations can be found. 
Second, the decision to apply the parental alienation 
framework unless there is domestic or family violence 
cannot work when violence is concealed. Thus, we cannot 
expect to solve the problems with parental alienation 
theory with rules regarding parental alienation (such as 
disregarding a child’s wishes or forcing contact) that apply 
unless there is domestic violence. 
This conclusion should be seriously considered not 
only by judges and lawyers, but also by experts, evaluators, 
and actors in the child protection system. 
 
142  See Zaccour, “Crazy Women and Hysterical Mothers”, supra note 84. 
143  See Meier, “A Historical Perspective”, supra note 10 at 245. 
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Recall that many scholars have exposed parental 
alienation as primarily a means of refuting claims of 
domestic violence.144 Others see domestic violence and 
parental alienation as existing independently: Drozd and 
Olesen, for instance, say that domestic violence and 
parental alienation can coexist and that both hypotheses 
must be tested to discover the reason for a relationship 
problem.145  
In Kelly and Johnston’s theory, “[c]hildren who are 
realistically estranged from one of their parents as a 
consequence of that parent’s history of family violence, 
abuse, or neglect need to be clearly distinguished from 
alienated children.”146 But is it enough to distinguish 
parental alienation from realistic estrangement, given that 
Quebec courts do not consider the estrangement 
explanation before concluding that a parent is 
alienating?147 As Joan Meier notes, “[v]irtually every 
article about alienation and abuse . . . gives lip service to 
this principle: that if abuse is real, then alienation is not.”148 
But since unsubstantiated allegations of violence are 
 
144  See Meier, “Getting Real About Abuse and Alienation”, supra note 1 
at 221. See also Peter G Jaffe, Claire V Crooks & Nicholas Bala, “A 
Framework for Addressing Allegations of Domestic Violence in Child 
Custody Disputes” (2009) 6:3/4 J Child Custody 169 at 176. 
145  See Leslie M Drozd & Nancy Williams Olesen, “Is It Abuse, 
Alienation, and/or Estrangement?: A Decision Tree” (2004) 1:3 J Child 
Custody 65. 
146  Kelly & Johnston, supra note 9 at 253. 
147  See Zaccour, “Parental Alienation in Quebec Custody Litigation”, 
supra note 2 at 1073, 1107. 
148  Meier, “Getting Real About Abuse and Alienation”, supra note 1 at 
242. 
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considered proof of alienation, and since women are 
blamed for “overreacting” even when domestic violence is 
proven, the problem remains.  
For Meier, models that ask evaluators to choose 
between alienation and violence are dangerous, because 
“[t]reating parental alienation as an equivalent concern to 
abuse in custody-litigating families . . . inherently devalues 
abuse allegations.”149 She recommends assessing abuse 
first “whenever there are allegations of abuse,”150 and 
evaluating alienation only “after abuse has been screened 
out.”151 She adds that “[w]here abuse allegations are not 
confirmed, the allegations themselves may not be treated 
as evidence of alienation.”152 Other good-faith protective 
actions, such as calling child protection or taking the child 
to therapy, should also be excluded from the definition of 
alienation.153 Meier’s suggestions are indispensable if we 
want to minimize the injustices caused by the parental 
alienation belief system.  
I propose to go one step further: concerns about 
domestic violence should always be at the forefront, 
whether or not it is alleged. Courts facing cases of alleged 
parental alienation should know that, even if there is no 
trace of it in the file, domestic violence can still be present. 
They cannot rule out domestic violence simply because the 
 
149  Ibid at 221. 
150  Ibid at 242. 
151  Ibid at 220. 
152  Ibid at 243. 
153  Ibid at 230. 
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mother has not mentioned it or because it is not otherwise 
apparent. 
Practically speaking, screening for domestic 
violence must happen in every case, even when domestic 
violence is not alleged.154 For example, when courts are 
faced with allegedly alienating behaviours by a mother,155 
they should first ask whether her behaviour could be 
explained by domestic violence and whether it would be 
consistent with an attempt to protect herself and her child. 
Even when domestic violence cannot be confirmed despite 
active screening, legal professionals might still want to 
pause to consider what their practices and the rules they 
apply would mean if the mother and child were victims of 
undisclosed violence.  
More generally, we also need to think about how 
the law and influential scholars define parental alienation. 
For family law to adequately ensure women’s and 
children’s safety, a series of unlikely steps must succeed: 
domestic violence must be alleged, identified, resolved, 
and properly dealt with. This is not the reality of our courts. 
Thus, the legal community cannot assume that domestic 
violence will simply sort itself out. A conscious effort must 
be made to develop legal rules that are sensitive to that 
(potentially hidden) context. 
 
154  This would be akin to the duty of family dispute resolution 
professionals in British Columbia to screen for family violence under 
the Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25, s 8. 
155  I found no trace, in any of the cases read, of disappearance of domestic 
violence against the father. 
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There are excellent arguments for simply 
eliminating the concept of parental alienation from family 
law. But if courts and evaluators are to use it, then we need 
a definition that accounts for domestic violence. The law 
and theory of parental alienation—from its definition to its 
consequences—should be constructed bearing in mind 
undisclosed domestic violence. This is far from the case 
now, as behaviours such as asking for full custody, moving 
to a women’s shelter, or saying that the father is dangerous 
can all be considered alienation.  
If we cannot obtain a framework for parental 
alienation that works for cases of undisclosed domestic 
violence—a framework which will ensure mothers’ and 
children’s safety—then it is indeed time to retire the 
concept.  
CONCLUSION 
Elsewhere, I have argued that the right way to think about 
and construct family law rules is to prioritize domestic 
violence concerns and to treat situations of intimate partner 
violence as paradigmatic rather than exceptional cases.156 
The importance of centring domestic violence is all the 
more relevant in parental alienation cases, given the 
concept’s frequent use by violent fathers and its history as 
a tool to marginalize mothers’ safety concerns.  
Parental alienation scholars reject this method and 
defend their theory by saying that it does not apply to 
 
156  See Suzanne Zaccour, “All Families Are Equal, but Do Some Matter 
More than Others: How Gender, Poverty, and Domestic Violence Put 
Quebec’s Family Law Reform to the Test” (2019) 32:2 Can J Fam L 
425. 
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circumstances of family violence. But despite the 
appearances, domestic violence cannot be treated as an 
exceptional case—not in family law generally, and even 
less in parental alienation cases. In this study of alienation 
cases at the appellate level, 78 percent of the cases 
appeared to have no allegation or trace of domestic 
violence, yet previous decisions involving the same family 
revealed that at least 59 percent of alienation cases 
involved an issue of domestic violence. We must be very 
conscious of the risk that appellate courts—and the judges 
and scholars who read them—will see parental alienation 
as an issue unrelated to domestic violence, while parental 
alienation remains primarily alleged in domestic-violence-
related cases.  
My article thus sends a word of caution to scholars 
and judges who believe in treating “pure” parental 
alienation cases differently from cases with cross 
allegations of domestic violence and parental alienation. 
We cannot think about parental alienation without 
considering domestic violence, and this applies even within 
theories in which a finding of domestic violence excludes 
a finding of parental alienation.  
Parental alienation and domestic violence are not 
separate fields of study.   
  
358 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 33, 2020] 
 
